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Abstract 
 
Current mechanisms to compensate inventors and improve legal access to their 
inventions remain ineffective. Manufacturers encounter significant transaction costs 
in the process of licensing the multitude of patent rights implicated in their products. 
High-technology product manufacturing requires access to a diverse pool of 
technologies that are owned by different organizations all over the world. The 
transaction costs of licensing these disparate rights are inhibiting unlicensed 
manufacturers in emerging economies from entering important markets and 
simultaneously limiting the revenue patent owners can generate from non-exclusive 
licenses. As communications technologies improve, innovative licensing mechanisms 
are emerging that can help firms avoid many of these transaction costs. Search and 
information costs, bargaining and decision costs, enforcement costs and adjustment 
costs all limit the value generated from licensing transactions. These costs are 
particularly severe for smaller firms that lack complementary assets to develop their 
products, lack experience with licensing and do not have large human and financial 
resources to invest in negotiation outcomes. The transaction costs of licensed 
manufacturing increase exponentially when having to license multiple rights among 
disparate rightsholders in a global market. By identifying, grouping, and valuing 
different rights into a single license, PatentBooks, an illustration of an electronic 
patent licensing platform, reduces search and information transaction costs. Firms 
instantaneously identify appropriate license rights from all over the globe without 
investing considerable resources in hundreds of discrete negotiations. Patent owners 
are able to generate greater non-exclusive licensing revenue from manufacturers than 
they could by licensing their rights in isolation. In doing so, they permit firms of all 
sizes and nationalities to generate more returns from technology and accelerate 
innovation by facilitating access to valuable inventions. 
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Introduction 
 
“The pen and paper system of transacting IP will not scale to meet the needs of the 
global marketplace.” – Hank Barry (former Napster CEO) 
 
As communications technologies proliferate around the globe and actors in 
knowledge-based economies turn to intellectual property rights (IPRs) to generate 
revenue from innovations, licensing is becoming increasingly important. Annual 
revenue from IPR transactions witnessed phenomenal growth worldwide with the 
diffusion of digital communications, growing from $10 billion in 1990 to over $200 
billion in 2007 (McClure). Patents are the most widely licensed of IPRs and are an 
integral component of the global innovation system. Trade in technology is 
progressively more common and studies suggest there are now greater opportunities 
for licensing and increasing revenue from patents (Arora, Fosfuri, et Gambardella 
2001).  
 
Companies are relying on patents more and more in order to generate revenue. 
Monetizing patents and integrating new technologies into product manufacturing is 
increasingly important. The majority of R&D, and consequently patents, originates 
from the US, Europe, Japan and Korea. The majority of manufacturing is done in 
China, India and the rest of the developing world. Yet, manufacturers need access to a 
wide range of patents in order to manufacture technological products. Patent owners 
also need access to a large network of manufacturers if they wish to monetize their 
patent rights effectively. Though communications technologies have helped foster an 
unprecedented rise in patent licensing, there are still ample opportunities to leverage 
new aggregation methods and digital networks to reduce transaction costs associated 
with this process. Aggregating patent rights into useful product bundles and creating a 
one-stop licensing platform will enable both small and large firms to generate greater 
value from patents. 
 
This paper outlines the transaction cost benefits of a specific type of aggregated patent 
license called the PatentBook. First, the growing value of intangible assets is briefly 
reviewed. The shift in perceiving IPRs as intangible assets that should be proactively 
managed to enhance business value and the various motivations for licensing are then 
discussed. The second section of the report introduces the theory of transaction cost 
economics and outlines the characteristics of the TAEUS PatentBook. Finally, 
transaction costs associated with bilateral licensing are descriptively compared to 
those experienced under the PatentBook model. Arguing that PatentBook licensing 
capitalizes on the advantages of bundling patent rights, economies of scale, 
communications technologies, and specialized expertise, we posit that firms can use 
PatentBooks to monetize their patent rights or access much need technologies while 
simultaneously limiting transaction costs associated with patent licensing. 
Licensing as a Form of Patent Management 
 
Approximately 6.7 million patents were in force around the world in 2008 (WIPO 
2010). Another 5.94 million patents were at some stage of the application process in 
the same year. The volume of patents granted around the world has grown steadily 
over the past 25 years, despite fluctuating year-on-year growth rates. 
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Figure 1. Patent Grants Worldwide 
 
(Source: WIPO 2010) 
 
Though these trends suggest the growing importance of patents to business value, 
managers are often reluctant or unable to incorporate this knowledge into viable 
strategy alternatives. Traditional defensive approaches to patents have led to the 
under-management of valuable assets (Borod 2005) and patent management is 
increasingly important to many different types of firms (Arora, Fosfuri, et 
Gambardella 2001). Canadian technology giant Nortel Networks is a prime example 
of how companies can lose out on value if they use their patents only as defensive 
tools. Unable to generate sufficient revenue to continue operations, Nortel Networks 
filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009. Nortel’s patent assets were then bought in 
2011 during bankruptcy proceedings for $4.5 billion by a consortium led by Apple, 
Microsoft, Sony and Research in Motion.
1
 Kodak is encountering similar problems 
from its defensive approach to patents. MDB Capital Group estimated in August 2011 
that Kodak’s digital-imaging patents - which comprise only 10% of its patent 
portfolio - are worth $3 billion, more than five times Kodak’s total market 
capitalization.
2
 Patents have seen a dramatic evolution from a purely legal asset in 
infringement lawsuits to a key corporate financial asset that has become the primary 
driver of revenue in the knowledge-based economy (Kossovsky 2002). The lack of 
common management approaches or valuation standards for patents has led to high 
variation among firms in terms of the governance and incentive structures deployed to 
stimulate value capture from patent assets and consequently high variation in its 
utilization (Chesbrough 2006). Yet, the switch to intangibles as the key generator of 
value in developed economies should not be underestimated. The 80/20 inversion is a 
popular term given for this development. Thirty years ago intangible assets 
constituted approximately 20% of publically traded company value in the US whereas 
now they comprises up to 80%; empirical data demonstrates this is also true for small 
private companies who generate 13 to 14 more patents per employee on average than 
large firms (Millien and Laurie 2007, 2). 
                                                        
1 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/jul/01/nortel-patents-sold-
apple-sony-microsoft 
2 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-17/kodak-worth-five-times-
more-in-breakup-with-3-billion-patents-real-m-a.html?cmpid=yhoo 
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Figure 2. Components of S&P 500 Market Value 
(Source: Ocean Tomo 2009) 
 
 
 
Analysts argue a large fraction of patents are now traded (Serrano 2006) and patent 
reassignment data shows that the market for patents in the US grew from 2000 
reassignments in 1980 to nearly 90,000 in 2003 (Chesbrough 2006). Though the data 
includes reassignments involved in mergers and acquisitions deals, administrative 
records and other transactions not directly attributable to the patent market, the 
transfer of patent rights is a large and growing reason for this reassignment. 
 
Patents are emerging as a powerful and valuable asset class (Monk 2009) and the 
strategic use of patents is increasingly seen as an important component in creating and 
extracting value from technological innovation. IBM illustrates the case. IBM 
licensing income grew over 500% from 1990 to 2001, generating $1.9 billion in 
revenue in 2001 alone (Sneed et Johnson 2009). Estimates suggest IBM has made 
over $10 billion in licensing revenues since 2003 (Monk 2009). Patent licensing has 
evolved into a major source of revenue for many firms in sectors as diverse as 
software, health, aerospace, telecommunications, energy and many others. The 
transfer of patent rights both accelerates innovation by improving technology transfer 
and increases the value extracted from otherwise under-leveraged assets. Annual 
transactions relating to IPRs have seen a dramatic increase since the integration of 
digital networks in economic activity, from $10 billion in 1990 to over $200 billion in 
2007 (McClure). With this in mind it is hardly surprising that an emerging market for 
the trade of intangible assets will become a key component of sustainability and 
competitiveness in the coming years; ‘intellectual property lies at the center of the 
modern company’s economic success or failure’ (Thurow 1997, 96). While patents 
are the most effective value-creation tools for research-based companies, capital 
remains their dearest resource (Kossovsky, Brandegee, et Giordan 2004). As 
innovative methods help companies reduce the transaction costs of licensing around 
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the world, firms must seize new opportunities to generate more value from patents in 
the knowledge-based economy. 
The reasons for licensing patents 
 
Firms decide whether or not to license patents based on an assessment of whether or 
not it will maximize their profits. It is not surprising that firms with different business 
models and organizational structures approach licensing in different ways (Aoki et 
Nagaoka 2004). Teece established long ago that the boundary of a firm, in terms of 
the range of assets at its disposal, is a critical determinant of its ability to capitalize on 
innovation (Teece 1986). Complementary assets traditionally determine the winners 
in innovation because the scope and structure of firms has an important impact on the 
profit distribution between imitators and innovators (Teece 1986). Capitalizing on 
product or process innovations is about much more than R&D. These are critical 
ingredients of innovation, but profiting from them is equally reliant on the ability to 
manufacture, distribute, and market those products around the world. Large 
companies dispose of greater access to the complementary assets necessary to 
manufacture, market and distribute their innovations (Arora, Fosfuri, et Gambardella 
2001). This means that they can generate more value from R&D efforts by exploiting 
their innovations on a greater scale across more products and markets.  
 
Academics distinguish between small R&D firms that specialize in ‘exploration’, due 
to their organizational culture and expertise, and large firms that focus on 
‘exploitation’, due to the economies of scale and scope provided by their 
complementary assets (Arora, Fosfuri, et Gambardella 2001). Licensing patent rights 
enables managers of ‘exploration’-based firms to focus on their particular field of 
expertise while simultaneously extracting revenue from R&D, without the need for 
complementary assets. By the same token, large ‘exploitation’-based firms can 
capitalize on the research efforts of others by accumulating patent rights and 
exploiting them efficiently through their large manufacturing and distribution 
infrastructure. The exchange of patent rights also permits firms to extract revenue 
from markets with prohibitively high barriers to entry because they no longer rely on 
direct access to complementary assets to create value. Essentially, firms lacking the 
complementary assets for efficient downstream commercialization are able to 
partially substitute their production with licensing programs (Arora et Fosfuri 2003). 
 
There are numerous motivations for managers to license patent rights. Doing so can 
maximize profits from an innovation while simultaneously optimizing the R&D costs 
within the firm towards new, potentially lucrative, ventures. Firms can share risks 
associated with technology investments and expand the use of R&D output beyond 
their core markets. If a firm abandons operations in a particular industry or ceases 
R&D in a given field, more value is generated from selective patent licensing than 
from sitting on a redundant patent portfolio. Some patent owners also seek to generate 
cash immediately through brokered licensing transactions rather than engage in 
complex bilateral licensing programs, which often engender significant time, financial 
and human resource costs for managers who rely on the credible threat of litigation to 
extract royalties (Monk 2009).  
 
This threat of litigation is a major reason for why manufacturers license patent rights. 
Operating firms increasingly seek patent rights in order to defend their products from 
7 
 
lawsuits filed by non-practicing entities (NPEs) and patent owners. Major 
international NPEs such as Intellectual Ventures are estimated to own over 35,000 
patents.
3
 Estimates of the market capitalization loss resulting from NPE lawsuits in 
the software industry alone over the past twenty years are around $0.5 trillion.
4
 In 
1998, there were less than 250 companies that were engaged in litigation with an 
NPE. By 2010, that number has skyrocketed to 2,600, an increase of 48% over the 
average of the previous three years. The accumulation of large patent portfolios for 
this reason has caused serious competitive and antitrust issues. This is an important 
consideration in the development of more liquid patent markets that should be 
carefully monitored.  
Transaction cost economics of Patent Licensing 
 
The economic efficiency of patent licensing is strongly influenced by the context in 
which exchange occurs. The majority of licensing agreements have historically been 
the result of one-off, private negotiations between contracting partners. This 
engenders significant transaction costs and mitigates the total value generated by the 
management of patent assets.  
 
Since Ronald Coase we know that the efficiency of market transactions cannot be 
takes as given. (1937; 2007) The Coase Theorem describes the economic efficiency of 
any market allocation or outcome in the presence of externalities. It is hinged on the 
notion that private negotiations always lead to more efficient allocation of resources 
than state intervention. Belief in the rationality of free market forces is a fundamental 
component of transaction costs economics from the beginning. However, Coase 
purported that market transactions were riddled with transaction costs, which 
necessarily reduced the efficiency of any allocation or outcome. In order to reduce the 
negative influence of transactions costs on the efficiency of contractual exchanges, 
these costs had to be identified, understood and limited. Transaction costs were 
identified, for example, when economic actors spent time to identify potential clients, 
negotiate contracts and enforce their compliance. By acknowledging the existence of 
transaction costs in exchange, economists could explore the coordination mechanisms 
that might minimize them (Hansen et Schmidt Bischoffshausen 2007).  
 
Transaction costs, when they are prohibitively high, can inhibit the realization of 
valuable cooperation profits. They exist in economic exchange because formal 
transactions necessitate the identification of potential partners, pre-agreement 
negotiations, the communication and codification of contractual terms, the drafting of 
final contracts and the monitoring of compliance (Coase 2007). These transaction 
costs should not be confused with the final license fees (contract prices) agreed upon; 
‘the fee is a measure of the value of the transaction; the transaction cost is the cost of 
making the transaction and thus realizing the value’ (Posner 2004). Focusing on 
market transactions means that transaction costs economics has largely ignored the 
                                                        
3 http://www.intellectualventures.com/NewsRoom/PressReleases/11-11-
30/Nanya_and_Intellectual_Ventures_Sign_Intellectual_Property_License_Agree
ment.aspx 
4 http://opensource.com/law/11/9/ginormous-losses-npe-software-patent-
lawsuits 
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impact of power over private bargaining outcomes as well as the role of 
macroeconomic regulation and state intervention in economic efficiency (Hansen et 
Schmidt Bischoffshausen 2007). Interestingly, it is often the perception of transaction 
costs by managers that is significant. While managers are rarely explicitly aware of 
the theory of transaction costs, they are consistently engaged in decisions where 
transaction costs are important and have a sophisticated understanding of the relevant 
issues (Buckley et Chapman 1997). It is not particularly helpful to pretend that each 
transaction cost can be quantified objectively and no case has been encountered where 
managers engaged in a numerically justified assessment of various transaction costs; 
essentially ‘managerial perceptions matter, and transaction costs cannot be quantified 
or measured separately from these perceptions’ (Buckley et Chapman 1997).  There is 
accordingly a limit to the conclusions that can be drawn from transaction cost 
analysis. Yet, transaction costs are nevertheless a useful framework to analyze the 
potential impact of PatentBooks on licensing efficiency. 
 
Cooter and Ulen distinguish between the various chronological phases of a market 
transaction in order to identify four different categories of transaction costs (Cooter et 
Ulen 2007): 
 
1) Search and information costs – the costs accrued when soliciting potential 
contracting partners, which must be identified and information about them 
supplied and processed. 
2) Bargaining and decision costs – the costs accrued during the negotiation 
and conclusion of contracts, once a contracting partner is identified. The 
contract process is time-consuming and legal advice is expensive. 
3) Enforcement costs – the costs accrued after the contract is concluded and 
compliance must be monitored and often legally imposed. 
4) Adjustment costs – the costs accrued over time when unforeseen need for 
contractual review may arise. 
 
The PatentBook model 
 
The primary rationale for PatentBook licenses, created and brokered by TAEUS 
Global Licensing (TGL), is based on the fact that the manufacture of technological 
products requires licensing multiple patents from a variety of actors around the globe. 
Because a single successful licensing transaction can take many years and relies on 
multiple negotiations, the threat of litigation, and significant managerial attention, the 
transaction costs associated with the accumulation of all the rights necessary to 
manufacture a certain product can be prohibitive. In fact, most companies and 
institutions do not have the resources necessary to engage in bilateral licensing on this 
scale. This is particularly the case today, where manufacturers responsible for a high 
proportion of the global volume of technology products are situated in emerging 
economies like India and China, while patent owners originate primarily from the 
developed world. PatentBooks thus primarily target two types of firms: product 
manufacturers that assemble PatentBook products and firms that own the patents 
included in the PatentBook.  
 
Aggregating patents and offering single price licenses to manufacturers is commonly 
associated with the development of technical specification standards. Technical 
9 
 
specification standards are created by industry associations and amongst competitors 
in order to ensure that all system components designed for new products are 
interoperable. Aggregated patent licensing exists today for a number of products, such 
as DVD, RFID, MPEG and 4G/LTE technologies. Collaboration between private 
organizations in setting industry standards and royalty rates has led to concern over 
the competition and antitrust issues this raises (Choi 2003; Gilbert 2004; D.J. Teece et 
Sherry 2003). This is a legitimate concern but one that is not elaborated on here since 
we are concerned only with transaction costs. Aggregating patents judged essential to 
an underlying technical specification, and excluding all others, facilitates the 
legitimate manufacture of high-technology products. Collectively agreed rules 
establish how license royalties are distributed, which can lead to problems if owners 
perceive their patents to be of a higher quality than others. Quality is an important 
issue in the aggregation of patent rights and it is vital to establish fair and explicit 
methods for distributing royalties. Aggregating patents in certain product domains is 
difficult because the inventions are not covered by a technical specification standard. 
Since most technology fields do not have specifications, this is an important issue. 
 
PatentBooks do not aggregate patents according to underlying technical 
specifications. Instead, they aggregate patents according to product requirements and 
offer a single license for all the patents to manufacturers of that product. Patent 
owners receive non-exclusive licensing income from unlicensed manufacturers who 
make products using patents in the PatentBook. The target licensees for PatentBooks 
are thus product manufacturers that currently do not license the technologies 
integrated into their goods. TGL, as the PatentBook aggregator and license broker, 
distributes the majority of the PatentBook royalties to patent owners and charges one-
off fees for evaluating exceptional patents in the book. A weakness of the PatentBook 
approach, from the perspective of patent owners, is that TGL takes 40% of income 
from PatentBook licensing. This is due to the administrative costs of aggregating the 
patents, maintaining the online platform, and identifying suitable manufacturers for 
license agreements. Patent owners may be reluctant to share this proportion of 
licensing revenue with an intermediary, opting instead to license their rights 
bilaterally themselves. However, because submitting patents to a PatentBook does not 
block owners from pursuing their own license negotiations, the revenue generated is 
complementary rather than a substitute. 
 
PatentBooks distribute royalty income according to the quality of the patents included 
rather than the quantity. This is an important difference to other patent aggregation 
methods. Many analysts suggest that only around 0.5% of patents in a portfolio are 
serious value generators, with another 10-15% being useful in license negotiations. 
The rest of the patents included are of minor importance. Since patent owners will not 
aggregate their patent rights with others if they feel they are not being fairly 
remunerated, distributing royalty income according to patent quality ensures that 
contributors with a high quantity of low quality patents do not receive a 
disproportionate amount of revenue from the single license. TGL publishes a 
framework of quality criteria, which allows owners to determine whether the patents 
are worth submitting to the PatentBook. Owners must also submit relevant 
documentation. TGL acts as the arbiter of patent quality self-evaluation but does not 
evaluate the patents directly in order to avoid conflicts of interest.  
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The relative quality of patents in the PatentBook are ascertained by evaluating the 
patents based on several criteria commonly used in licensing transactions across three 
major domains: technical, legal and financial/market.  Quality criteria include the 
following factors: observability, ease of investigation, technological maturity, current 
commercial use, future commercial use, lack of prior art, availability of alternatives 
and scope of claims. This system is a human-based process where multiple subject 
matter experts score a patent from 1 to 5 on each of the criteria. This step-by-step 
framework for assessing quality is distributed by TAEUS to potential submitters who 
evaluate the patents themselves. Quality evaluation is important because quality 
determines the royalty income distribution among patent owners in the PatentBook.  
The top 2% of patents in the PatentBook will receive 50% of the royalty income. The 
next 13% receive 35% of the royalty income. The last 85% receive the remaining 
15%. Evaluating patents prior to their inclusion in the PatentBook has a secondary 
benefit to the industry because, if a patent ranks poorly in terms of quality criteria, it 
suggests the patent is of low worth and should be dropped. Determining royalty rates 
according to patent quality is significant because patents are often aggregated around 
a few blockbuster patents. PatentBooks recognize the disparity in value between weak 
and strong patents and ensure that the owners of strong patents are rewarded fairly. 
 
The transaction cost implications of PatentBook licensing 
 
The growth in the licensing of patents for downstream use suggests that technology 
markets are increasingly important for managing patents and manufacturing high 
technology goods (Razgaitis 2005; Athreye and Cantwell 2007). As growing demand 
for technologies increases demand for underlying patent portfolios and the low 
transport cost of technologies enables the large-scale exploitation of those rights in a 
globalized market, licensing is increasingly recognized as a valuable revenue 
opportunity (Arora, Fosfuri, et Gambardella 2001). The transfer of patent rights has 
conventionally been achieved through bilateral licensing negotiations (Caves, 
Crookell, et Killing 1983; Arora 1995; Teece 1986). However, historical cases of 
aggregate patent licensing have shown that it reduces transaction costs in a number of 
product markets such as movie projectors, hydraulic pumps, swimming pool cleaners, 
beds, and synthetic polypropylene fiber production (Merges 1999b). Bilateral 
negotiation is a private and sequential bargaining model (Jarosz et al. 2005) that 
offers flexibility and privacy but is plagued by multiple transaction costs. Brokers of 
an aggregated patent license reduce the number of negotiations necessary to access a 
range of patents and apply technological and legal expertise to reduce the complexity 
of licensing (Reiko Aoki et Schiff 2010). Common procedures in terms of contract 
drafting, due diligence, negotiations, and enforcement enable the broker to leverage 
economies of scale and scope in order to reduce the per unit cost of licensing. By 
reducing transaction costs associated with licensing, brokers increase the number of 
licensing transactions overall and generate more revenue for patent owners (Arora et 
Fosfuri 2003). No robust and disaggregated quantitative estimates exist for the 
transaction costs associated with licensing. The intangible nature of patents and the 
private context of bilateral negotiations make accurate assessments inherently 
difficult. However, the transaction costs commonly encountered in bilateral license 
negotiations can be compared to those encountered in PatentBook licensing in order 
to highlight the differences.  
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Search and information costs 
 
Identifying, contacting and vetting partners can be an extremely time- and resource-
consuming process. License partners must first be identified and then all relevant 
information about them must be collected, supplied and processed. In some cases, the 
cost of identifying all patent owners can be so high as to be prohibitive. A 
manufacturer in China will have to invest considerable resources in identifying and 
processing all information about the patents – and their owners – that are implicated 
in an LCD display in order to legitimately manufacture it and access important 
international markets. These search costs automatically limit the manufacturer’s 
ability to identify all the relevant rights as well as the most attractive licensing 
partners. They may resort to unlicensed manufacture, assuming that the infringement 
costs incurred in the future will not exceed the immediate transaction costs of 
licensing all relevant patents. This is a negative outcome for the patent owner as well, 
who loses out on immediate royalty income and must deploy the threat of litigation to 
extract revenue from infringers. 
 
PatentBooks aggregate all the patents necessary to manufacture specific products into 
one license that is instantaneously and universally accessible. Manufacturers can 
license the hundreds, or even thousands, of patents implicated in their products 
simultaneously, in a single transaction without incurring litigation expenses. 
Licensing information can be accessed easily from a single point rather than involving 
the time-consuming and expensive process of traveling the globe and trawling 
through commercial databases that lack common standards and interoperable formats. 
Manufacturers no longer have to identify all the relevant patents and their owners. 
PatentBooks help managers quickly identify the rights they need for specific products, 
cutting the time and resources expended on search and information processes. 
Empirical evidence shows multiple factors influence licensing transaction costs and 
consequently the decisions of firms to engage in licensing. Companies are more likely 
to enter into licensing relationships with partners who closely fit their technological 
and market profile (Kim et Vonortas 2003). PatentBooks match buyers and sellers 
more effectively since they collect, organize and standardize this type of information. 
A firm can identify a large pool of patents without suffering the high search and 
information costs associated with bilateral bargaining breakdown. A Chinese LCD 
manufacturer may simply be unaware of who owns all the patents implicated in their 
product. An LCD PatentBook enables the manufacturer to quickly and easily identify 
these rights and license them in a single transaction, thus reducing search and 
information costs substantially. Revenue is generated from non-exclusive licensing 
agreements with previously unlicensed product manufacturers. Patent owners receive 
a share of the licensing revenue – as dictated by the quality of the patents contributed 
– without needing to identify and negotiate individually with the manufacturers.  
 
The information costs of due diligence are a serious obstacle to the efficient matching 
of licensees and licensors. This cost is particularly acute when bilateral bargaining 
breaks down and negotiations must start again with a new contracting partner (Jarosz 
et al. 2005). In bilateral licensing, where each negotiation is a new and discrete 
relationship, simply examining and discarding incoming offers can be daunting. Due 
diligence in pharmaceutical in-licensing deals can amount to over two thirds of the 
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total deal-vetting costs. With an average cost of $1.9 million and a ceiling of up to $6 
million, due diligence is a large investment.
5
 Large pharmaceutical in-licensing deals 
are complex and require many stages of approval, which increases time and personnel 
costs rapidly. The survey of pharmaceutical firms found that the total cost of vetting 
potential licensing deals ranged from $660,000 to $8 million per deal.
6
 Clearly, there 
are a range of costs depending on the complexity and size of the deal and the industry 
in which it occurs. This range implies due diligence is a major burden on bilateral 
licensing deals. The high information cost of due diligence is partly the result of 
‘information impactedness’, ‘where information that is privately held, difficult to 
measure, or unknowable, hinders efficacious contracting’ (Posner 2004). PatentBooks 
alleviate this problem by systematically collecting and organizing information 
relevant to the transaction for third parties. TGL insulates these parties from identity 
exposure. Since unsuccessful attempts to license patents can expose a company to 
litigation risks or provide critical strategic information to their competitors, a degree 
of anonymity avoids some information costs associated with bargaining breakdown. 
 
PatentBooks reduce the total search and information costs of identifying license 
partners and spread the remaining costs among multiple users. Consequently, TGL 
can deploy a far more sophisticated search technology than individual users could 
hope to implement by themselves (Reiko Aoki et Schiff 2010). The value of a 
network increases with each additional user, generating positive feedback to network 
size (Arthur 1994). The value of PatentBook licensing increases the more patent 
owners and licensees are attracted to the platform because this increases the amount 
of searchable information about patents and licensees. In the same way that a Chinese 
manufacturer will suffer transaction costs to identify all the owners of patents 
implicated in LCD displays, owners of LCD technologies suffer transaction costs 
associated with identifying and collecting information about all the possible Chinese 
manufacturers. Significantly, an online exchange exhibits increasing returns to 
adoption. The search and information costs per transaction typically associated with 
licensing are steadily reduced as more members join. Since the communications 
infrastructure is already established, additional users can be added to the network at 
no or marginal cost. This means the exchange easily incorporates new members, 
increasing the value of its service, and in turn attracting more members. Positive 
feedback loops improve the user value created by stimulating adoption and fuelling 
network effects (Shapiro and Varian 1999). ‘Demonstration effects’ suggest that the 
more a product becomes prevalent the more it is known, and thus the more likely 
people are to use it (Arthur 2000). This phenomenon is evident in social networks like 
Facebook, MySpace and Linked-In as well as online marketplaces such as Ebay. 
Facebook users have grown at an exponential rate. The total number of Facebook 
users increased from 1 million to 100 million between December 2004 and August 
2008. Its user base grew the same amount to 200 million by April 2009, 300 million 
by September 2009, 500 million by July 2010, 750 million by June 2011 and finally 
850 million by November 2011.
7
 As the advantages of the PatentBook platform are 
                                                        
5 http://www.cuttingedgeinfo.com/2011/due-diligence-costs-pharmaceutical-
in-licensing-deals/ 
6 http://www.cuttingedgeinfo.com/2011/due-diligence-costs-pharmaceutical-
in-licensing-deals/ 
7 http://www.benphoster.com/facebook-user-growth-chart-2004-2010/ 
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demonstrated through its use, the exchange should attract more participants and thus 
increase its value. 
 
Aggregating and organizing patent information on an online exchange relies on 
multiple technologies and standardized processes. Advancements in Internet 
technologies, particularly the advent of web 2.0 utilization architectures and 
networking capabilities, are a critical facet of effectively matching patent owners with 
manufacturers in a global market. The Internet facilitates the exchange of ideas 
among culturally diverse, decentralized and geographically disparate individuals or 
companies (Brabham 2008). The vast scale of the web and the instantaneous 
exchange possible between users enables the efficient aggregation of disparate rights 
(Terranova 2004). Communication technologies permit participative, multidirectional 
and highly inclusive behavior (Delfanti 2010) as they break down transaction cost 
barriers separating small and multinational firms. Most importantly, the PatentBook 
exchange capitalizes on the semantic web: searchable patent rights databases are 
efficient because web content is increasingly understood by computers that perform a 
large amount of the tedious tasks that share and combine the information provided by 
the multiple users (Albors et al. 2008). Strict self-evaluation and submission processes 
enforced by TGL enable this process. Patent owners can conveniently submit patents 
at no cost and offset patent maintenance costs with the minimal royalties received 
from participation in the PatentBook. The patents can also be removed at no cost. 
Patent owners simply need to honor the terms of the licenses granted prior to the 
removal of the patent from the PatentBook. The technology for aggregating user-
generated content is low-risk and mature. PatentBooks leverage these technologies 
and deploy them in tandem to reduce patent licensing search and information costs. 
 
Bargaining and decision costs 
 
Bargaining and decision costs are the costs encountered during the negotiation and 
conclusion of contracts after a partner is identified. The bargaining process of contract 
terms and royalty rates can be a time-consuming process that requires expensive legal 
advice every step of the way. Licensing agreements are generally embedded in a host 
of other contractual agreements. These can include R&D agreements relating to 
product development, manufacturing agreements ascribing the right to manufacture, 
downstream IP agreements and sales agreements, as well as tacit-knowledge transfer 
agreements involving the loan of personnel across organizations. The importance of 
explicitly defining the working relationship also requires a set of confidentiality, 
interim, feasibility and prototype agreements in most cases. Costs accumulate rapidly 
in negotiations, particularly for smaller firms that do have the same level of 
experience with licensing and cannot rely on legal and financial resources to the same 
degree as their larger counterparts. 
 
Difficulties in licensing transactions occur because of disagreement over patent 
valuation (Mard, Hyden, et Rigby Jr 2000; Merges and Nelson 1994) and obstacles 
associated with the fuzzy boundary definitions of patent rights (Teece 2000a; Somaya 
et Teece 2001). Experimental evidence implies that individuals evaluate fairness in 
negotiations in a self-serving manner (Babcock et al. 1992; Loewenstein et al. 1993). 
This complicates licensing because licensors systematically attribute a higher value to 
their inventions than licensees (Posner 2004). Costs also accrue due to diffuse patent 
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entitlements, where determining which patent is implicated in a product and who 
owns it can be difficult (Somaya et Teece 2001). Because technologies are subject to 
technical and commercial uncertainty, the value of a patent can be the subject of 
significant dispute. The resolution of these disparities introduces transaction costs 
(Merges and Nelson, 1990; Merges and Nelson 1994). Effectively, ‘since the true 
validity and extent of property rights conferred by a patent may only be ascertained 
after lengthy and expensive legal proceedings, this leads to genuine disputes as well 
as strategic posturing during licensing negotiations, significantly increasing costs and 
delays’ (Somaya et Teece 2001). Differences in bargaining power and the inefficiency 
of licensing contracts are generally cited as the main reasons why innovators cannot 
efficiently capture rents from innovation (Arora, Fosfuri, et Gambardella 2001). This 
is especially true when corporate licensing managers intentionally extend negotiations 
in order to extract concessions from smaller parties. A typical strategy to limit fees 
and lower the final license price is to stretch out and confuse the entire bargaining 
process (Detkin 2007). This may improve a licensing executive’s corporate 
performance indicators while only being a minor drawback to their organization, 
which disposes of significant financial resources and an integrated legal department 
for contract negotiations. However, smaller firms with more limited resources may be 
pressured into concluding rapid negotiations on less favourable terms due to the cost 
of extending the bargaining and decision process.  
 
As the PatentBook broker, TGL mediates between interested parties, helping to 
resolve disputes about valuation and leveraging its experience to draft carefully 
tailored contracts. The enforced patent self-evaluation procedures - based on 
technical, legal and financial/market assessments that are common in the licensing 
industry – provide a uniform set of conditions that justifies as well as clarifies royalty 
distribution among the patent owners contributing to the PatentBook. By regularizing 
the transaction mechanisms for technology licensing and reducing the total volume of 
transactions necessary for licensing a specific product, PatentBooks lower overall 
negotiation costs. Transparent mechanisms for the resolution of disputes reduce 
uncertainty and uniform license terms reduce the costs of exchanges with 
manufacturers. TGL helps reassure license partners that negotiations are fair and 
influences the perception of managers regarding the extent and impact of transaction 
costs. The exchange mechanism also reduces the need for geographical proximity 
between contracting partners and helps mitigate some of the opportunistic behavior 
common in license negotiations. Yet, as the PatentBook administrator, TGL is in a 
privileged bargaining position relative to patent owners and manufacturers. Since 
licenses are offered to manufacturers at a uniform price set by TGL, and the 
manufacturer’s only alternative is to negotiate each contract bilaterally, TGL could 
exploit its position to extract more revenue for patent owners and thus itself. 
However, because maximum licensing revenue is achieved by balancing high 
transaction volume with adequate royalty remuneration, TGL benefits from balancing 
the interests of patent owners and product manufacturers in a transparent manner. 
Crucially, the PatentBook does not restrict an owner from entering into independent 
bilateral license negotiations.  
 
Repeatedly engaging in a high volume of contract negotiations results in considerable 
expertise that enables TGL to streamline the bargaining process. Individual 
negotiation time and cost is reduced via partially standardized contractual terms. The 
application of largely uniform conditions on all parties confers legal certainty and 
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reduces the likelihood of recourse to legal advice. In copyright licensing, the cost to 
rightsholders and potential license partners of the information, coordination and 
administration procedures would be prohibitively high if done individually (Besen, 
Kirby, and Salop 1992). Copyright collecting societies benefit from economies of 
scale that reduce transaction costs and increase total transaction volume as a result 
(Handke and Towse 2007). TGL, while operating as a broker rather than a collective 
licensing organization, achieve similar results. Despite incurring high fixed costs to 
establish and maintain the administrative infrastructure of the platform, the exchange 
reduces fixed administrative costs per member on average by increasing the volume 
of transactions. This approach benefits from decreasing average costs in facilitating 
contract negotiations and passes those advantages on to its members. It leverages 
economies of scale in order to reduce the per-unit cost of licensing and the 
corresponding real resource costs associated with it. These economies of scale are not 
possible to the same degree when firms pursue licensing agreements individually. The 
US Supreme Court has recognized that aggregate patent licenses regularize 
technology transactions and, like collective copyright licensing, ‘their basic economic 
rationale is that they significantly reduce the transaction costs of exchanging rights 
when compared to a series of one-shot licensing deals’ (Merges 1999b). 
 
Most high-technology products incorporate multiple patents from a wide range of 
owners. This results in patent thickets or royalty stacking, where taxation occurs to 
such an extent among firms that it can halt the rate of innovation or impede 
manufacturers from producing certain goods. The integration of disparate rights for 
licensed manufacture can be a major obstacle to producers. The costs of integrating 
rights into a product bundle is aggravated by the existence of multiple, discrete rights 
that grant their owners the opportunity block any given stage of negotiations. The 
‘anti-commons’ effect in IPR transactions describes how the process of clearing rights 
to manufacture a product can be prohibitively difficult or expensive, (Heller et 
Eisenberg 1998). When a wide range of exclusionary patent rights cover a single 
product, it can be very costly to clear those rights for manufacture because of the 
costs associated with bargaining and decision processes; ‘each upstream patent allows 
its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product development, adding to 
the cost and slowing the pace of downstream’ innovation due to transactional failures 
(Merges 1999b). One-off negotiations to clear these rights between multiple parties 
results in bargaining breakdown and holdup in negotiations, increasing transaction 
costs (Calabresi et Melamed 2007; Libecap 1989).  
 
A Chinese manufacturer of LCD displays will need to negotiate with many different 
organizations all over the world in order to clear the rights implicated in their product. 
Semiconductor, matrix, illumination, and polarizing technologies are only a few of 
the technologies included. Not only will these multiple discrete negotiations entail 
massive transaction costs but every negotiation must be successful in order to begin 
production. Bargaining break down with a single partner risks jeopardizing the entire 
process if substitutes cannot be found. PatentBooks aggregate disparate patent rights 
for specific products into useable bundles that preserve R&D incentives while 
simultaneously overcoming the tragedy of the anticommons associated with patent 
thickets and royalty stacking (Merges 1999b). A Chinese LCD display manufacturer 
can instantly identify the PatentBook for LCD displays on the TGL platform and 
license every patent right needed in a single transaction. Aggregate patent licensing is 
frequently cited as a useful tool to overcome the harmful impact of overlapping patent 
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rights (Layne-Farrar et Lerner 2011; Shapiro 2001). It is particularly valuable in high-
technology industries where patent owners are scattered around the globe and 
manufacturers need to access a large bundle of rights simultaneously. By bundling 
rights and offering a single license, PatentBooks lower the average transaction cost of 
licensing individual patents. The explicit framework developed by TGL for dividing 
royalty income among IPR owners in the PatentBook also avoids the typical member-
to-member transaction costs of establishing an aggregate patent license. Rather than 
engage in lengthy negotiations on the distribution of royalty revenue and the licensing 
terms offered to users, the guidelines established by TGL help owners navigate every 
step of the process without introducing significant bargaining and decision costs 
associated with collective action. Different assessments of the value of patents, 
private information held by members about the precise technical specifications of a 
product, and strategic posturing in negotiations can all be mitigated by well-
administered patent aggregation. Unfortunately, patent owners will need to relinquish 
some individual control to the intermediary to facilitate this process. However, 
Merges remarks that this can lower the overall costs of this otherwise complex 
licensing activity (1999b).  
 
Enforcement and adjustment costs 
 
Enforcement costs summarize the costs incurred after a contract is concluded and 
compliance must be monitored and enforced. Both monitoring and enforcement costs 
are a managerial concern because the cost of enforcement litigation can be 
devastating. Patent infringement lawsuits are expensive and frequently result in early 
settlements in order for infringers to avoid higher awards of damages and extended 
legal costs. Boston Scientific paid a settlement of $1.725 billion to the Cordis division 
of Johnson & Johnson in early 2010 in order to settle a dispute over coronary stent 
patents.
8
 Medtronic paid a settlement of $1.35 billion to Dr Gary Michelson in 2005 
in order to settle an infringement lawsuit for $550 million and then acquire the 
implicated patents for $800 million.
9
 Sony’s walkman and Playstation portable 
products were found to be infringing Agere Systems’ patents in semiconductors, 
wireless communications, audio and optical electronics in 2006. A settlement verdict 
of $18.5 million was finally reached.
10
 Apple was forced to pay OPTi Inc. $21.7 
million in 2009 for patent infringements relating to cache computer memory.
11
 The 
final court decision on December 3 2009 of $19 million in actual damages and $2.7 
million in pre-judgment interest followed a lengthy trial that began with an official 
complaint on January 16 2007.
12
 Clearly, IP infringement settlements can be 
expensive. Infringement verdicts, in the absence of a settlement, can be even costlier.  
 
                                                        
8 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/business/02device.html 
9 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/02/business/02device.html 
10 http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/settlements/12875/sony-settles-
patent-infringement-18-5-million.html 
11 http://pulse2.com/2009/12/04/apple-forced-to-pay-opti-21-7-million-over-
patent-disputes/ 
12 http://pulse2.com/2009/12/04/apple-forced-to-pay-opti-21-7-million-over-
patent-disputes/ 
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In order to avoid these costs, licensing partners often include compliance monitoring 
mechanisms in licensing contracts. If a patent owner perceives the cost of monitoring 
compliance to be too great, they are unlikely to license their patents at all. TGL 
reassures owners by introducing compliance regulations, auditing contracting 
partners, and mediating during disputes. Introducing a third-party license broker is 
particularly valuable for smaller companies that do not dispose of the complementary 
assets or financial resources to initiate long and costly infringement litigation 
procedures. Larger firms will be reluctant to rely on third-party monitoring and 
enforcement mechanisms that diminish control over their patent assets. However, the 
transaction efficiency gains possible via centralized administration can overcome this 
concern. Studies have shown that the sharing of large swathes of land increases the 
ability to privately enforce property rights when compared to enforcing rights 
individually over a host of smaller units (Field 1989).  
 
PatentBooks, by aggregating patent rights into a single-point license administered by 
TGL, diminish overall monitoring and enforcement costs. While monitoring 
safeguards can be integrated into bilateral agreements, the average transaction cost of 
monitoring and audit mechanisms is reduced as a result of the greater volume of 
transactions. TGL leverages economies of scale in order to reduce the per-unit cost of 
monitoring, in much the same way that it is able to reduce the per-unit cost of contract 
bargaining. Sophisticated analytic software tools simplify this process without the 
need for consistent and costly human intervention to facilitate transactions. Since 
accurate measures and transparent monitoring can solve many of the transaction costs 
associated with enforcement (Posner 2004), the accumulated experience of TGL 
serves as an additional source of transaction costs reductions. Moreover, patent 
owners retain complete ownership of all patents listed in the PatentBook and preserve 
their right to litigate independently against any unlicensed party. They receive 
periodic lists of unlicensed and licensed parties from TGL, and can also benefit from 
licensing income from government initiatives to promote SME development and 
innovation. 
 
PatentBook licensing opens new markets to manufacturers while legal access to 
highly advanced technologies in a targeted product domain enable the manufacturer to 
incorporate ever more technologies into their product lines. They consequently enjoy 
greater freedom to operate. Manufacturers also reduce the risk of patent litigation that 
could disrupt their product deliveries by taking out a PatentBook license that is passed 
directly through the supply chain to the retail customer. Manufacturers that have not 
used the license remain open to patent enforcement lawsuits, injunctions on product 
shipments and disruptions to their supply chains. Manufacturers that have licensed the 
PatentBook are able to avoid sales channel disruptions, management distraction, and 
the poor market perception of offering unlicensed technologies. They are comfortable 
in the knowledge that they pay the same PatentBook license rate as all other 
manufacturers and can focus their time and resources on manufacturing, marketing 
and distributing products rather than licensing the underlying rights. 
 
Adjustment costs are the transaction costs that arise over the course of the licensing 
relationship when unforeseen need for contractual review occurs. Bilateral license 
partners often become mutually suspicious or perceive they have miscalculated the 
terms of their agreement. For example, the global market for LCD displays shrinks 
after the development of an alternative technology. The product returns forecasted 
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during negotiations to establish a license price then far exceed the actual returns to the 
Chinese manufacturer. Or the manufacturer wishes to integrate the licensed patents 
into more products in different markets. To do this, the manufacturer must adjust the 
terms of the agreement during license extension negotiations. This process necessarily 
gives rise to contractual adjustment costs. TGL helps contracting parties communicate 
their concerns and review contracts. Mediation by a neutral third party reduces 
opportunism between licensors and licensees. As with all the other stages of contract 
negotiations, the volume of adjustment transactions facilitated by the broker enables it 
to leverage economies of scale to reduce the cost of each individual contract 
adjustment.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The patent system is founded on the idea that technological development accelerates 
when inventions are made public. Patent archives today are one of the most valuable 
references of human discoveries in the world. Communications technologies enable 
these inventions to be rapidly copied all over the world but they have not been 
adequately deployed to create efficient mechanisms to compensate inventors. As 
technologies converge, new opportunities are arising to improve access to inventions 
and reward creators fairly. The music industry is a revealing parallel. Illegal file-
sharing exploded with the advent of the Internet and peer-to-peer software. As record 
companies struggled to retain former profit margins, they sued young individuals and 
platforms such as Napster in order to discourage the free sharing of music. Apple 
recognized that many Internet users were willing to pay for music if it was 
conveniently accessible in digital form. iTunes effectively permitted larger audiences 
to access more content while compensating creators more than the previous 
distribution model. The patent market is experiencing similar problems. The Internet 
enabled corporations all over the globe to access patented inventions and integrate 
them into commercial products without adequately compensating inventors. Patent 
attorneys, non-practicing entities, and corporate litigators stepped in to discourage the 
free use of IP, reward patent owners and capitalize on infringement litigation. 
However, new distribution models to transfer technology in a commercially 
responsible manner have not been adequately leveraged. The patent market needs a 
one-stop shop for licensing thousands of patents from patent owners via standardized 
license terms at predictable royalty rates and cash flows to licensors and licensees.  
 
The current market for patent licensing suffers high transaction costs. Most licensing 
transactions are executed as a result of one-off, bilateral deals that are privately 
initiated, organized, negotiated, and executed. The clandestine and discrete nature of 
bilateral licensing engenders significant transaction costs in all four chronological 
phases of a market transaction. Search and information costs, bargaining and decision 
costs, enforcement costs and adjustment costs are all important transaction costs that 
can mitigate the total value generated from bilateral licensing or even prohibit a 
transaction altogether. These costs are particularly acute for smaller firms that lack the 
resources and experience with negotiating license agreements enjoyed by their larger 
multinational counterparts. Transaction costs reach prohibitive dimensions when a 
manufacturer must license thousands of patents from separate organizations in 
bilateral negotiations.  
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PatentBooks aggregate patents, classify them according to quality, and offer non-
exclusive licenses to manufacturers. Sophisticated search technologies and web 
architectures render patent-related information much more accessible and organized. 
Firms are able to instantaneously identify potential license partners anywhere on the 
globe without having to invest considerable resources in the process. The 
accumulated licensing experience of the PatentBook broker enables interested 
companies to reduce transaction costs associated with bargaining and decision 
processes by relying on a third party mediator. Aggregating patents into a single, 
uniformly priced, non-exclusive license that covers all patents necessary for 
manufacturing a specific product further reduces these costs. This is perhaps the most 
important transaction cost reduction of the PatentBook model. Instead of incurring the 
cost of hundreds of discrete, one-off negotiations with different actors, manufacturers 
can access all the necessary patents in a single license. Patent owners are able to 
generate greater non-exclusive licensing revenue from manufacturers than they could 
if licensing their rights in isolation. Economies of scale also permit transaction costs 
reductions at the enforcement and adjustment stages, where mediation limits disputes 
and decision costs. 
 
While transaction costs associated with patent licensing will never be eliminated 
altogether, PatentBooks are a valuable mechanism to reduce them and thus increase 
the total volume and value of licensing transactions. They enable patent owners to 
generate greater value from their assets and permit product manufacturers to 
legitimately integrate new technologies in their products as well as access important 
markets. The inefficiencies of bilateral licensing currently constrain the legitimate 
manufacture of high-technology products and the transfer of technology, limiting the 
acceleration of innovation in both the developed and developing world.  It also 
restricts the value that firms can extract from owning patent assets. PatentBooks help 
aggregate the course of dealing and pricing for technology transfer and provide 
visibility and unbiased reach across the buy-sell barriers. In doing so, they enable 
firms of all sizes and nationalities to generate more returns from technology.
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